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INTERACTIONIST THEOHRY, HUAN BEEAVIOR
SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION
Ralph Segalman
California State University
Northridge, California
Much explanation of human behavior is based on assumptions about
animal behavior. Two major contemporary theories, Behaviorism and
Freudianism place major emphasis upon the human being as animal.
Many middle-level theories have no reference to man's distinctive
social characteristics. However, social explanations of behavior do
have a heuristic advantage in the study of human functioning and
"social pathology."
Symbolic interaction theory operates on the assumption that man
lives in a symbolic environment as well as in a physical (animal)
environment. Symbolic learning emanates from the social processes
men experience. Symbols represent personal meanings, values and asso-
ciated feelings.
In symbolic comuunication, one person, seeking to elicit specific
behavior from another, selects a symbol from his "library." The indi-
vidual believes that he has chosen the one symbol likely to create
the desired behavior. He encodes the symbol into a "signal" and broad-
casts the signal by some means of communication. He mav use speech,
writing, or some non-verbal act, and he may not broadcast the signal
perfectly.
Then the receiver tries to decode the signal into a symbol, by
retrieving what he thinks are the appropriate meanings and values.
If the symbol has approximately the same meaning and value to both
people, the desired action may occur. Becuase each person associates
the symbol with his own meanings and values, which are based on his
past social learning, much depends on whether both people have had
similar past social learning.
*Meaning refers to the way in which people actually use a par-
ticular term in their behavior. A "value" is a learned attraction or
repulsion which the individual relates to a particular symbol or mean-
ning. A "symbol" represents an incipient or telescoped act in which
the later stages (involving elements of both meaning and value) are
implied in the first stage.
People learn symbols by interacting with other people. We can
view symbols as having common or shared meanings and values for most
people in a society. This provides the society's "mainstream popula-
tion" with a quality of "consensual validation," even though the
consensus of understandings is never complete. Mainstream people share
many common norms and ideals. Norms are direct guides to positive acts
or values. Ideals are what the individual says or believes he would
like to do. Norms sometimes coincide with ideals. Even when ideals
do not coincide with norms, they provide guides to behavior as "remote
goals to be reached indirectly."
Much adult behavior is learned from symbolic communication of
norms and ideals rather than from direct trial and error. A culture
is an elaborate set of meanings and values tied to symbols and shared
by others in society. Culture guides human behavior. By learning the
culture, men are able to predict each other's behavior most of the
time and to gauge their own behavior to the way they expect others to
act. A society is possible only when common symbols and expectations
exist.
However, a person does not act in predeterminable ways even
though his actions are purposeful and voluntary. Each person acts
according to his "definition of the situation." He has to interpret
other people's behavior and to make a personal assessment of what is
"right and proper" at the moment.
People interpret symbols emotionally as well as intellectually.
When a person makes a rational, substantive "definition of the situa-
tion" he also makes an affective definition of the situation. Ideally,
the affective definition deals primarily with deciphered meanings
rather than feelings. The effective system can operate in one of a
number of ways:
1. As a support of the rational analytic system
2. As a diversion from the rational analytic system
3. As opposition to the rational analytic system
4. As a neutral process
The way in which the emotional system operates can affect the
way a person decides to behave, the sharpness of his perception,
the way he chooses to decode other people's signals, and the success
with which he chooses the symbols he transmits. So feelings are
important because they can augment or impede a person's encoding and
decoding abilities. People also use feelings when they decide what
experiences and interactions to have in the future.
To the interactionist, social organization is the end product
of behavior patterns which evolve from people's attempts to achieve
goals. No two people define situations identically, and people are
always re-interpreting their situations, so behavior is always chang-
ing.
Interactional "stabilities," which come from a shared culture,
give people a behavioral referent. From the interactionist view,
a fully functional person is one with an adequate repertoire of
roles, role behaviors, norms, symbols, and role equipment.
The fully functional person has tested these roles in experiences
within the "mainstream" of societal interaction. In such a "competent"
person the variety of symbols, meanings, values and other role equip-
ment are -deqpzate to secure a reasonable "fit" in communication with
most other persons in his society. This "actor" has, thereby, earned
so complete a sense of security in his role competence that he is able
to balance a sense of personal autonomy with a countervailing sense
of responsibility to others and society. This is what might be des-
cribed as the most highly developed level of normative behavior.
The deviant, from the interactionist view, is someone with
problems of communication and understanding. Interactionist theory
defines deviance as more than an abnormality on the part of an indi-
vidual or individuals. Instead it posits that failures of communica-
tion, past and present, cause the individual to construct a definition
of the situation which is much different from other peoples' defini-
tions of the situation. Such conflict of "definitions" is a product
of the communications and understandings of more than one person.
People become "more than animals" by a process of socialization which
moves through psychogenic, blockage and word stages. In time a person
gains a personal sense of "reality" which is established and maintained
by the consensus of the groups which have meaning to him. "Objective
reality" differs from "consensual reality" in that it is validated
by accepted "experts" over a period of time. Learning occurs primarily
in relation to significant others. The significant other is someone
with whom the individual participates in role reciprocity. These
significant others encourage and constrain each other's behavior
through validation or non-validation of each other's acts. Only from
a sense of congruity of meanings with significant others does one
derive "social security." Therefore, the meanings used by significant
others have strong affective or expressive significance, and define the
intensity of relationships. The significant other serves as a model for
the individual and helps shape the individual's self-concept. This
self-concept is basic to self-esteem.
Developmentally, behavior precedes meanings and feelings. The
individual's ability to communicate with himself enables him to con-
sciously construct his behavior beyond rote performance. As the
individual observes the behavior of others he arrives at hypotheses
about the motives of others. Motives are a category of meanings.
Continued consideration of other peoples' motives is a necessary pro-
cess for social interaction. Interpreting other peoples' behavior
helps the individual define who he is, and where he stands. In a
sense, motives can be interpreted as rules or guidelines of interaction
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and have been labeled "interactional hypotheses." These hypotheses
can be either instrumental or terminal. Instrumental hypotheses
make possible the mutual exploration of motives for the planning of
future interactions. Terminal hypotheses interpret the behavior,
meanings or feelings of others in such a way that interactions between
the self and others are distorted, constrained or prevented. The
individual who is unable to arrive at workable instrumental hypotheses,
or who has learned distorted sets of symbols and meanings, or whose
"creativity" produces meanings and values not understood by others will
exhibit behavior considered deviant by the conventional society.
Let us consider the "operational reality" by which behavior is
judged. The operational reality must enable individuals to predict
what others will do, and to foresee the results of their own actions.
It must contain a logical unity and be simple enough to be useful.
It must have a self-correcting capacity. It must be fairly stable and
upheld over time.
To understand behavior, we must also consider anxiety. Anxiety,
as defined by Kelley, is the encountering of a situation for which
there is no previous socialization. Anxiety is manifested in stress
and discomfort. As socialization (that which the individual knows
and accepts) interacts with anxiety, a struggle ensues between the
two processes. Deviant behavior occurs when anxiety, rather than
socialization, predominates in the individual's dynamics. When an
individual commits behavior which the operational reality classifies
as illegal, immoral, non-conformist or unanticipated, the behavior is
considered deviant.
Interactionist societal theory holds that the nature of the
transaction or confrontation is not as important as the meanings which
people attach to their own actions and to the actions of others. A
person does not act in a predeterminable way; his actions are purpose-
ful and voluntary.
Thus, actions are not as much the result of exchange or of coer-
cion, as they are the result of the individual's differing situation
definitions.
It should be noted that a residual effect occurs when a person
does not have an adequate repertoire of symbols, meanings, values and
roles necessary to deal with a situation. In such instances he reverts
to animal-like behavior and this is often evident in times of violence,
aggression, or escape.
Among the various societal theories, interactionism is probably
singular in its emphasis upon the mutual causality of communication
difficulty and deviance. It takes two or more persons to create com-
munication ineffectiveness. Functional deviance is a product of in-
effective communication. According to this theory, such problems as
non-somatic mental illness, mental retardation, neurosis, character
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disorders, and difficult interpersonal relations can be traced to
misperception, misinterpretation, mis-orientation, and inadequately
provided and perceived socialization. (See Blumer 1967, Blumer 1969,
Scheff, Glisinian, Hurwitz, Rose, Nannis, Melther, Dreitzel, Gordon
and Gergen, Kuhn, Thomas, Berger and Lucman, Shibutani 1961, and
Shibutani 1970.)
In the study of social work it is important to understand that
the societal model one uses not only indicates choices of alternative
interventions, but also sets up a series of definitions which are
critically decisive for social work and its clients.
The model of society utilized by the social worker (and his
teachers) strongly shapes the following:
1. Definition of the client and populations to be served
2. Definition of the most effective social work service and
interventions
3. Definition of the social work task and its parameters
4. Definition of the nature of social problems
5. Definition of the most effective agency structure
6. Definition of the roles of the client, worker, client
"others," agency, profession, etc.
7. Definition of the sanctioning authority and its degree of
legitimization
8. The nature of "prognosis" for social work
9. The location of responsibility for the social work task in
the society
10. Priorities for clienteles to be served, problems to be
addressed, services to be rendered
11. Choice of the theoretical frameworks to be utilized in social
work
12. The degree of objectivity sustained by the profession in the
utilization of design and use of research measures of
effectiveness
Because the model of society used largely defines the social work
goal, it is easy to understand why social work professionals have
difficulty determining what is effective service. Until the profession
(and its teachers) agree on a societal definition, professionals will
continue to be confused about what are the tasks at hand and whether
those tasks are being accomplished.
Under the interactionist model, the deviant is one who is out of
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communication with society and its subsystems. The client of social
work, therefore, attaches meanings and value ladings to his own actions
and the actions of others which are out of congruence with accepted
meanings and value ladings. He is unable to, or does not desire to
value interaction with the mainstream of society, so social conflict
or social dysfunctionality occurs. Where the client presents a problem
in his own functioning this can be viewed as inadequate interactional
socialization and understanding. This can explain malfunctions. Where
this occurs in groups, it can be related to incongruous understandings
of role functions. Where it occurs between marginal groups and society,
it can be laid to "deviant cultures," and to the gap in cosmunication
between them and the mainstream. Under this model of society, the
social worker's role is one of clarifying meanings for those involved.
Social work's role under interacticnist theory is focused on
effecting or re-effecting communication between participants in social
conflict, between the deviant cultures and the "mainstream," and
among individuals and groups who create or perpetuate social problems
by their differential understandings of qymbols at issue. Thus, to
help those who are alienated we should attempt to increase understanding
of the definitions of realities held by the mainstream, in efforts to
achieve some congruency of comprehension.
Other theories define social problems differently. Distorted,
inappropriate behavior (and explanations of such behavior) might be
labeled as mental illness of the individual by the "consensualist"
social worker. Such behavior might be viewed as inadequate preparation
for meaningful exchanges by the exchange theorist social worker. The
same behavior might be viewed by the conflict theory social worker as
coping mechanisms resorted to by a "loser" in what Laing designated
as "family politics." Under interactionist theory such behavior (and
the counterpart behavior of other members of the family) would be
viewed as mutually aberrant distortions of reality involving a complex
of interacting persons. In this sense, the interactionist view of such
behavior is parallel to the views of Szasz, Rycroft and others.
Social work's task, under interactionist theory, is to reduce incongru-
ity of meanings to a minimum so that a commonly acceptable civilization,
and a minimization of societal strain are gained. Since social struc-
ture is founded upon the commonality of meanings, community and human
welfare is unattainable in a semantic and emotional "tower of babel."
When almost everyone has distortions or bluntings of meanings, due to
inexact communication, strains and problems proliferate.
Social work under interactionist theory cannot seek official
authorization from the society. Unlike psychotherapeutic services
and probation programs, it cannot serve as an officially chosen
instrument of social control. The rationale for this is related to
the fact that interactionist service is a "bridge" service. If the
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social work service takes its authority from the society, it commits
itself to accept only those lefinitions of meaning, valuation, etc.
which are established by the mainstream. Under publicly sponsored
circumstances such services would amount to nothing more than a public
relations service or a one-sided interpretive office rather than a
communication effectuator. Social work under interactionist theory
must accept responsibility for the broader conceptualization of society,
which includes not only the mainstream but also all of those "out of
phase" with the mainstream. This makes of the social worker a post-
conventional man - someone who owes allegiance to authority beyond
the offical state, the consensus and the contemporary social structure.
The worker may serve the contemporary society but his responsibility
goes beyond it.
From the symbolic interactionist view, "social pathology" and
social deviance may be considered to be results of dysfunctional or
skewed early social learning. Society defines mental disturbances as
anything so labeled by psychiatrists. Psychiatrists and related
professionals, according to Ssasz and others, base their determination
of mental disorder on the degree to which the acts of a person do not
coincide with societal norms. Symbolic interaction does not presume
that mental disorder is anything more then the product of the social
experiences of a person. It does not establish diagnostic positions
but instead views all human patterns of ating as part of a spectrum
of behavior. It provides opportunity for research-oriented study of
"mental disorder," without requiring acceptance of preconceived, un-
testable paradigms such as unconscious or libidinal forces. Finally,
it provides for a social explanation of ouch disorders.
The adoption of a social (non-disease) explanation of mental
disorder would deny society opportunities to transfer responsibility
from itself to the medical establishment. It would deny the medical
establisment the opportunity to perpetuate "treatment" programs for
which no evidence of effectiveness exists. It would provide oppor-
tunity to view unqualified parenthood as a potentially iatrogenic
process from which mental disturbances are predictable. It would
provide opportunities for study of professionalisms and institutions
which are potential spawning grounds for such disturbances. Finally,
it shifts the emphasis of treatment from clinical focus on the patient
to the developmental environmental and social context of the distur-
bance.
Symbolic interaction is not a new postulation in sociology. Its
application to the field of mental and emotional disorders is, however,
yet to be tested.
A Symbolic Interaction Typology of Deviance
Case #1 - The Non-Deviant Mainstream Member
The actor behaves in a manner which conforms with the expecta-
tions for him held by "others" in the social mainstream. The actor
has been reared to perceive events with a minimum of emotional skewing.
He receives, decodes, and records events with a general clarity of
meaning and with minimal emotional disturbances of rational processes.
Other actors perceive events in a similar manner, and in their inter-
action with the actor, mutually held meanings with neutral value ladings
and feelings are shared. Where perceptions are not completely congruent
they are resolved by mutual discussion.
Case #2 - The Member of a Deviant Culture
The actor and his peers value themselves highly. They have a
strong sense of group cohesion because they share a point of view and
a sense of worth. They screen out perceptions which will lower mutual
esteem. Thus, people who associate only with each other, and who pro-
tect themselves from contact with the incongruity of outside "inputs"
develop an increased uniformity of perception. The closed communica-
tion network insures that the groups' meanings for symbols and their
likes and dislikes develop an almost perfect "match." Their defini-
tions of reality increasingly deviate from that of the "mainstream."
Their definitions of "self" and their "worth" (value lading) also
deviates from the "mainstream's" definition of them and their "worth."
Their norms and symbols become highly idiosyncratic and ultimately
unrelated to "larger realities."
When individuals in such a closed clique or peer culture experi-
ence "social pathology" it is likely to be related to a conflict of
cultures between "the establishment" (the agent of the mainstream)
and the deviant culture. This conflict can occur on individual and
on group levels.
Case #3 - "Paranoid"
The actor has developed his elementary meanings and values in an
atmosphere where they have been distorted by this significant others or
have been distortedly perceived by him.
The actor perceives events with a different value lading than
other people use. Events which might "threaten" other people do not
make him feel threatened. Events which might please or reassure other
people may be threatening to him. It does not matter whether the
threat or support "really" exists. His perception, his situation
definition is so different from those of the "others" that others
cannot understand his behavior and they label him paranoid.
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Case #4 - "Mental Illness" general
The actor perceives events with meanings or conceptual content
much different than the "mainstream's," so his "situation definitions"
are different. This becomes evident in interpersonal conflicts when
other people's situation definitions prevail, the actor is viewed as
mentally deviant.
The actor becomes isolated from the others because he experiences
less group-validated communication, he depends more upon his own sub-
jective validation of all events, until his definition of reality is
completely different from other people's. At some point along the path
of communication deterioration, mental illness is diagnosed.
Case #5 - An Iatrogenic "Disease" of Commnication
The actor (as described in Case #4) is unable to have his defi-
nitions of events and their meanings accepted. When the resulting
interpersonal difficulties arise he is comitted to some institution
as 'mentally ill." A definition of his condition is forced upon him
by others around him. In the institution, he is pressed to reaffirm
a definition of his condition as "illness." In the process the actor
looses some of his accumulated validations that had made him consider
himself a valuable person in touch with reality. This makes the actor
more malleable and he becomes "institutionalized." He enters into
behavior more related to institutional needs than to the realities
of the world beyond the institution. Thus the actor focuses upon
symbols and norms which have meanings particular to the institution
and which have no relevance to the actor's world outside the institu-
tion. Because persons with lower levels of external value validation
act as expected by others who have higher self-value validation, we
observe a "self-fulfilling prophecy" condition. The actor's definition
of reality becomes dichotomized. He has one set of behaviors and
beliefs related to the others about him and another set of behaviors
and beliefs which he reserves to himself. He does not present his
personal beliefs and behaviors to others for evaluation or "testing."
When this occurs, it can be viewed as autism.
Case #6 - Neurosis
The actor's perceptions are not sufficiently congruent to those
of the others about him. This lack of congruence may be caused by
emotional "skewing" by cultural differences, or by experiences which
yield non-standard meanings and contents. The actor's security of
self is limited because he receives little validation from others.
The disparity between the actor's perceptions and those of the others
is not great enough to cause a complete breakdown of relationships
or ejection from the circle of others, but it does cause interpersonal
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strains which lead others to class him as psychoneurotic. Usually
the neurotic is a victim of cognitive dissonance. He is drawn almost
equally to two opposing positions.
The therapist may advise the client to reshape his definitions
to match those of the others, or may suggest to the client that he sub-
due his differences of definitions with the others. His perceptions are
being remade. On the other hand, the therapist may support the client's
perceptions, based on the therapist's own congruent perceptions, thus
validating the client's definitions of reality. Then the client is able
to devalue the reports of others and retain his autonomy.
The therapist thus becomes an interpreter of meanings. Such inter-
pretation is a continuing process, until the actor learns to arrive at
his own redefinitions. If the actor continues to rely upon the therapist
for definitions indefinitely the psychotherapeutic process serves as a
prosthetic device.
Case #7 - The "Character Disorder"
The actor's "significant others" have a definition of reality
which differs widely from that of the mainstream of society. Or, he
may misunderstand what his significant others do, and think that they
differ from the mainstream when they do not. In either case, when he
encounters the mainstream society, he confronts a set of symbols,
meanings, norms, etc., to which he cannot conform. Character disor-
dered persons have been called "moral idiots" because they do not
understand the mainstreamb definitions of what is right.
The actor will develop an entire complex of situational defini-
tions which agree with neither his associate's nor the mainstream's,
and his behavior will show this discrepancy. He will think that his
actions are justified regardless of their "cost" to others. Because
he has an entirely different set of "oughts" he seeks to reaffirm
his view about himself rather than accepting other people's judgements.
This actor develops little feeling of mutual trust. (Trust is
confidence that one's "significant others" will agree that what he does
is right, and that he can count on them for backing.) His definition
of a trust relationship never develops beyond one in which he simply
receives materials, services, and special dispensations.
The character disordered person, especially the sociopath, has
experienced little of an externally imposed value system, or he has
not succeeded in internalizing such values. He depends primarily on
values he learned as an infant, when his only role was to be "pleasured,"
satisfied, and relieved of tensions. Therefore the sociopaty seeks
tension-reductive activities with few "rules of the game" to control
how he secured gratification.
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Case #8 - The Non-Somatically Damaged "Mental Retardate"
The actor is permitted to enter into activity with others beyond
his own circle without an adequate preparation. His supply of symbols,
valences and meanings and symbol sets (including roles, counter-roles
and norms) is too small for him to be accepted as a societal actor,
and he is also unable to build on what he has learned so far. He has
already outgrown the chronological age when basic concepts are usually
absorbed. This incapacity makes communication with others difficult
because they think he is unable to exchange highly-developed concepts.
Thus, non-somatic mental retardation is a communication dysfunction
involving the individual and the others around him.
On clients in general
The social work view of the client, particularly of the undevelop-
ed or neurotic client can be very destructive if mainstream meanings
are imposed, and creative and autonomous meanings are devalued, in
the relationship. Similarly, the post-conventional client whose
value systems go beyond mainstream interpretations can be supported or
repressed by the values and meanings interpreted by the social worker
as appropriate and acceptable. Social workers must remember that the
mainstream seeks to discipline, often without reason, not only those
who fall below the established norms but also those who excel beyond
them. Deviance is not necessarily a matter of client change; it may
instead indicate a requirement for change in the client environment
or in mainstream meanings. A mainstream which is over-dominant can
be uncomfortably oppressive. Conversely, a mainstream which is too
diffuse provides an inadequate basis for communication and civilization.
The cases described above represent most of the types of "social
pathology." Note that each of the clusters of deviant populations is
marginal to the mainstream's operational culture. The deviants are
socially distant from the mainstream, and interaction between them and
the mainstream is minimal. Deviant cultures are usually dependent for
material support on the mainstream despite their lack of mutual commun-
ication.
Thus, individuals who are excluded, either by themselves, or by
the mainstream, are relegated to a "trade-off" relationship with the
mainstream. They receive limited benefits, but they relinquish contact
and participation with the mainstream. Because marginal people have
fewer chances to interact with mainstream people, they and their chil-
dren have even less chance to rejoin the mainstream. Thus excluded,
many people develop separationist coping mechanisms to deal with fears,
stress and feelings of inadequacy. Often the coping mechanisms make
communication even less likely, so the problem grows worse.
Thus, they and their children build a life pattern which constantly
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minimizes their opportunities to rejoin the mainstream and the problem
is aggravated by reproduction.
Over and beyond its explanation of the deviance of the non-
mainstream, symbolic interaction theory is highly heuristic in the
understanding and analysis of problems and social conflicts frequently
encountered in social work. Symbolic interaction theory explains
status inconsistency, cognitive dissonance and role confusion.
Eventually, this theory may provide models of differential dysfunctional
interaction scripts and resolution mechanisms for such problems.
Thus, symbolic interaction theory provides a model for explaining
social and individual dynamics, so that a rational plan, rather than a
mythology, can become the basis for appropriate treatment planning.
This theory also provides an understanding of the total communication
process which can become a basis for analysis of the problems of social
work. By giving common definitions of the nature of social problems
and of treatment goals and methods, this theory provides increased
meaning for the profession as an integration of knowledge and practice.
In the process, symbolic interaction provides social work educa-
tion with a more effective approaching to the teaching of social work.
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